

[For information on the Ukrainians in the Kuban Region, 1900-1933, see:
8: Fedenko, RDI Ukraine, cat. 116, pp. 60-62. -- Analyst]

132 vegetation is abundant, and near the sea semi-tropical in its luxuriance.

East of the Suram Mountains the climate is dry, with extremes of heat and cold. The summer is oppressively hot, particularly in the Kura valley. The Caspian basin, as a whole, suffers from drought, and in the Baku district violent sand and dust storms are common.

The climate in the Armenian Highlands shows characteristics similar to those of the two areas above described. At Alexandropol snow lies till the middle of April, spring lasts a fortnight, and the summer parches the country to the condition of a desert. The Aras valley has a somewhat less rigorous climate.

Recent climatic statistics for the three areas are shown in the table given on p. 7.

(4) SANITARY CONDITIONS

[544] Sanitation in anything like the modern sense of the
164 word is practically unknown in Transcaucasia. Medical facilities, except in the larger towns, are practically non-existent. Constant epidemics of malaria are caused by the marshy conditions prevailing on the Black Sea coast, and in the valleys of the Rion, Aras, and Kura. Goitre and epilepsy are common among the natives of Svanetia. Leprosy occurs among the poorer classes of the Persian population. Elisavetopol is notorious for the so-called Sartian sickness, a kind of skin eruption.

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

563 Of the numerous peoples represented in Caucasia,
197 some belong to the white race, others to the Mongolian
101 or yellow race.

I. The inhabitants who are of white race belong to the Indo-European, Semitic, or Caucasian families.

Indo-European Family.—Everywhere there are Russian officials, merchants, and soldiers, and there are also large numbers of peasants, who are either voluntary colonists or religious exiles from European Russia. They speak both Great and Little Russian.

Caucasia] HEALTH; RACE AND LANGUAGE 9

Germans, who came originally from Württemberg, live chiefly in the Tiflis Government and at Helenendorf near Elisavetopol. 197 101

There are some 14,000 *Greeks* in Tiflis, near the Turkish frontier, and in Chernomoria. They speak a corrupt form of Greek.

The *Iranians* include *Persians* at Tiflis, who number several thousands; the *Tates*, *Tats*, or *Tads*, descendants of Persian conquerors, who live chiefly in Baku, and speak either Persian or Tatar; the *Talyshes*, who are also of Persian descent, and live in the Lenkoran district; the *Kurds*, who come from the mountains on the Assyrian border, and have spread over a large part of Asia Minor and the Caucasus; and the *Ossetes* (calling themselves *Iron*), who occupy the central mountainous region from Mount Elbruz to Mount Kazbek in the east, and from Vladikavkaz in Ciscaucasia to the district round Dushet and Gori in the Tiflis Government.

The *Armenians* form the merchant and trading class in most of the towns. Armenian peasants are chiefly confined to the Governments of Erivan and Elisavetopol; they are more virile than the townbred Armenians, and cannot be easily distinguished from the Tatars.

Semitic Family.—There are over 45,000 *Jews* in the Tiflis and Kutais Governments and in Daghestan. The Jews of Tiflis and Kutais speak Georgian, those of Daghestan local dialects.

Caucasian Family.—This family is divided into three groups: the Kartalian or southern, the western Highland, and the eastern Highland. The language of the Kartalian group, except when otherwise stated, is Georgian; there are many dialects. The language is distinct from those of the Indo-European family, but has few affinities with other main Caucasian groups. To the *Kartalian group* belong the *Georgians* or *Gruzians*, who form the majority of the population of the Government of Tiflis, inhabiting the upper reaches of the Kura from Akhaltsikh to below Tiflis

543 and the Yora and Alazan plains as far as Zakatali.
 197 The *Imeretians* live in the Kutais Government, west
 101 of the Suram Mountains as far as the River Tskhenis
 Tskhali. The *Gurians* are found between the Rion
 and the Chorokh. The *Adzharians* and *Kabuletians*
 live in the Adzharia Tskhali valley in the Batum
 Province. The *Khevsurs*, *Tushes*, and *Pshavs* are wild
 mountain tribes belonging to the central Caucasus.
 The *Mingrelians* inhabit the country between the Rion,
 Ingur, Tskhenis Tskhali, and the Black Sea. There are
 a few *Lazis* in the south-west corner of Transcaucasia;
 most of this tribe live in Turkish territory in Lazistan.
 The *Svanetians* live in the valleys of the upper Ingur
 and Tskhenis Tskhali on the southern slopes of the
 main Caucasian chain.

[144] To the *western Highland group* belong the tribes who
 call themselves *Adighé*, but whom the Russians call
Cherkess (Circassians). They used to inhabit the
 Caucasus range from Taman to Pitsunda and the left
 bank of the Kuban in Ciscaucasia. They speak a harsh
 dialect of their own. The *Abkhassians*, who speak
 a similar dialect, occupy the Black Sea coast from
 Pitsunda to the Ingur.

Of the peoples in the *eastern Highland group*, the
Chechentsy or *Chechens* live mostly in the Terek Pro-
 vince, but there are still a few on the Daghestan frontier.
 The *Lesghians*, including the *Avar*, *Darginian*, and
Kurinian tribes, are the chief occupants of the Daghestan
 Highlands. They speak a guttural dialect of their own,
 though in the east the Azarbaijan Tatar patois is in
 common use.

[144] II. Of the peoples of Mongolian race the chief are
 the *Tatars*, who mostly come from the Persian province
 of Azarbaijan and occupy both banks of the middle
 and lower Kura, intermingled with Armenian and Kurd
 colonies. Their language is akin to Turkish, and is
 the *lingua franca* of western and southern Trans-
 caucasia. There are a few *Nogaites* Tatars in Daghestan.
 101 The Tatars in Kars Province are known as the
 563 *Karapapakhs*. The *Kumyks*, who live on the Daghestan

coast north of Derbent, are closely akin to the Azarbaijan Tatars. The *Turks* or *Osmanli* live chiefly in the Provinces of Kars and Batum. In the Province of Kars there are a few *Turcomans*.

To sum up for Transcaucasia, it may be said that the four important peoples are the Russians, Georgians, Armenians, and Tatars. It is upon these peoples and their mutual relations that the future of the country depends.

The official census of 1897 gave statistics of the various peoples in Transcaucasia. Though with regard to the more remote tribes these figures are only approximate, they are the best available and have served as a basis for all subsequent estimates. The distribution of the various peoples is shown in the following table:

GOVERNMENTS AND PROVINCES¹

	Baku.	Daghestan.	Elisavetopol.	Kars.	Kutais.	Tiflis.	Chernomoria.	Erevan.
Abkhazians -	2	28	—	7	59,469	46	2	—
Armenians -	52,233	1,636	292,188	73,406	24,043	196,189	6,285	441,000
Chechens -	10	757	13	63	46	2,207	5	3
Cherkess -	18	37	10	71	165	—	1,939	1
Czechs -	149	19	25	11	167	245	1,290	36
Georgians -	1,616	375	1,239	526	343,929	465,537	976	566
Germans -	3,430	261	3,194	430	1,065	8,340	748	210
Greeks -	278	38	558	32,593	14,482	27,118	5,969	1,323
Imeretians -	23	20	119	7	270,513	1,546	158	9
Jews -	8,172	7,361	185	1,138	7,006	5,188	990	850
Kabards -	23	31	—	19	7	14	—	—
Karachais -	—	4	29	6	16	67	—	3
Kumyks -	26	51,209	2	21	24	25	3	5
Kurds -	8	22	3,042	42,968	1,824	2,538	22	49,389
Lezgians -	62,972	450,912	22,601	524	446	43,094	72	124
Lithuanians -	272	520	116	892	450	1,263	47	384
Mingrelians -	39	10	37	10	238,655	498	304	13
Moldavians -	48	66	105	46	197	198	923	29
Nogai -	—	1,909	—	1	—	18	—	12
Osmanli -	1,255	18	9	63,547	46,665	24,722	650	245
Ossetes -	113	113	96	520	4,240	67,268	12	112
Persians -	5,973	1,720	338	568	1,022	1,991	210	235
Poles -	1,439	1,630	616	3,243	1,938	6,282	731	1,385
Russians -	77,681	16,044	17,875	27,856	23,443	85,772	34,546	13,937
Tatars -	485,146	32,143	534,086	2,347	750	107,383	291	313,176
Tates -	89,519	2,998	1,753	6	34	16	2	709
Turcomans -	74	9	4	8,442	8	12	—	1

¹ The Province of Batum and the District of Sukhum are included in the Government of Kutais. The District of Zakatali is included in the Government of Tiflis.

563 It will be seen from the above figures that Russians
162 form a majority in Chernomoria only, while the Armenians form a large majority in the Government of Erivan and the Province of Kars, the Georgians in the Governments of Kutais and Tiflis, the Tatars in the Governments of Baku and Elisavetopol, and the Lesghians in Daghestan.

(6) POPULATION.

Distribution and Density

161 The Russian official census of 1897 gave the total population of Transcaucasia as about 5,565,000. Since then various estimates have been made, based upon this census and the yearly increase of the population so far as it could be ascertained.

The Statesman's Year Book for 1918 gives the following statistics (approximate) for the population on January 1, 1915:

Area.	Population.	Density per Square Mile.
Baku	1,119,600	75
Batum	186,000	69
Chernomoria	201,800	63
Daghestan	732,600	64
Elisavetopol	1,117,200	66
Erivan	1,034,800	96
Kars	403,000	56
Kutais	1,070,300	130
Sukhum	147,600	58
Tiflis	1,394,800	88
Zakatali	101,800	66
Total	7,509,500	79

From this it will be seen that the population is densest in the Governments of Kutais, Erivan, and Tiflis, where the soil is richest and agriculture is the general occupation. The density of the population in the Government of Baku is largely due to the existence of the oil-fields.

Towns

361 *Tiflis* (population in 1913, 327,800) is the capital of 141Caucasia and the largest town. Next in size is *Baku*

Caucasia]

POLITICAL; EDUCATIONAL

33

from the District Courts' decisions could be taken to the ⁶³¹ Supreme Court at Tiflis, and from that to Peters-⁶⁹²burg. The Courts were accessible and cheap, and there was no discrimination between Russian subjects and foreigners in legal proceedings; but judgements given in Russian Courts had no effect in England, nor decisions obtained in England in Russia.

The Cossack communities are divided into *stanitzas*⁶³¹ or villages, each *stanitza* having an elected assembly of ⁵⁶³ 30 members; in populous *stanitzas* one man is elected from every ten households. These assemblies have wider powers than the usual *mir* or commune, viz. division of land, assessment of taxes, regulation of schools, grain stores, cultivation, &c., and the election of elders (*ataman*) and judges.

When the Revolution occurred in 1917, the Viceroy was recalled, and the various nationalities in the Caucasus arranged representative National Assemblies; but, as chaos in the Empire increased, relations were broken off with the Central Government. A separate ^[612] Transcaucasian Republic was formed, in the Government of which Armenians, Tatars, and Georgians were equally represented; and another new state called the Republic of Daghestan, under the presidency of a Lesghian of the Mohammedan faith, also emerged. The Cossacks, however, remained aloof.

(3) EDUCATIONAL

Public education was in the hands of the State, or was ⁸⁷¹ directly controlled by it. The number of persons able ^[212] to read or write in the Caucasus in 1912 was only 17 per cent., and the percentage of schools to the population was very low. Some progress was made in the provision of instruction during 1912 and 1913, but the outbreak of war hindered the completion of the various schemes put forward, in particular by the towns of Anapa, Novorossiisk, Yeisk, Temryuk, Maikop, Grozni, Georgievsk, Pyatigorsk, and Stavropol in

THE COMING OF THE RUSSIANS

191

III

THE COMING OF THE RUSSIANS

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Tsars¹⁷⁵ of Moscow had finally thrown off the yoke of the Golden Horde and established a nucleus of the Russian State, they found themselves confronted on the west by an aggressive Poland, dominating many hundreds of miles of Russian land, on the north-west by a Sweden which controlled all the Baltic coast, on the south by a Turkey which choked any development towards the Black Sea. Each of these three Powers in turn aspired to dominate Russian politics; the first two supported their pretenders to the Russian Crown, the third periodically sent the Crim Khans to burn Moscow, Kursk or Orel, and ravage all the broad lands around. In such circumstances did the Muscovite Tsars evolve the vast strategic plan the ultimate object of which was to be the control of their own gates—of the Baltic and the Black Seas. And the history of Russian expansion has been the history of the development of this plan, of the great agricultural lords of Muscovy directing the march of their peasant soldiers towards the river-mouths, that they might sell their grain and hides and minerals without the warranty of Swede or Pole or Turk.

On the vast southern front of the Russian State the expansion assumed the form of a struggle with the Ottoman Porte for the control of the Black Sea, which may be divided into two phases: the wars to acquire the Crimea and the mouths of the Don, Dnieper and Dniester; and the wars to secure the western and eastern flanks and the fortress commanding the entrance to the inland sea—the Balkans, the Caucasus and Constantinople.

The first bands of Cossacks, the forerunners of the Russians,¹⁷⁵ appeared in the steppes to the north of the Caucasus in the beginning of the 16th century. They settled along the northern banks of the Sunja, and along the Lower Terek, founding Tarku and Andreyevo. These received the names of Grebentsi (*greben*, "a ridge") and Terek Cossacks. They mixed much with the adjoining Kabardan and Chechen tribes, and acquired many of their customs and methods of agriculture. "The Cossacks of that day," says Baddeley, "were probably at most the equals in civilisation of the Chechens and Kumiks, and certainly the inferior of the Adighé, to whom belonged

175 the Kabardian princes and people." It was not until the be-
 543 ginning of the eighteenth century that the Grebentsi and Terek
 Cossacks felt the effective power of the Tsar, but in 1712 Peter
 the Great's celebrated admiral, Apraxin, received their official
 submission, and five years later they furnished a contingent
 for the ill-fated Khivan expedition of Bekovich-Cherkasski.

176 The gradual approach of Russia to the Northern Caucasus
 was of considerable interest to the Georgian princes. They
 saw in allegiance to the Tsar an alternative to the humiliating
 necessity of perennially seeking the patronage or protection
 of either of the two Mussulman Powers, and the more patriotic
 looked forward to the possibility of liberating and reuniting
 their country with the support of the great Orthodox Tsar.
 As early as 1586 King Alexander of Kakhetia had applied for
 Russian help against the Shamkhal of Tarku. A Russian
 expedition under the Boyar Khvorostin was cut to pieces by
 the Shamkhal (1594), but Tsar Feodor Ivanovich nevertheless
 assumed, somewhat prematurely, the title of "Lord of the
 Iberian Land, of the Tsars of Georgia, of Kabarda, of the
 Cherkess and Mountain Princes." The Shamkhal destroyed
 another Russian force in 1599, and the brief *rapprochement*
 between Russia and Georgia was terminated by the death of
 two of the principals to a dual marriage which had been in-
 tended to unite the families of Tsar Boris Godunov and of the
 Karthalinian Bagratids.

Throughout the seventeenth century intrigues continued
 without any definite results between the Russians and the
 Georgian princes. The heroic King Taimuraz of Kakhetia
 spent a long and arduous life in a struggle against the Persians
 and in vain journeyings both to Constantinople and to Moscow,
 to solicit foreign assistance. The Russians sent a mission
 on one occasion to Kutais (1658), and a few years later (1664)
 intervened at Isfahan in favour of a Georgian King who had,
 as a matter of fact, already been assassinated. But through-
 out the seventeenth century they had not the power, had
 they the will, to try conclusions with Persia or Turkey in
 Transcaucasia.

In 1722 Peter the Great, having pursued a chequered career
 of conquest against the Swedes on the Baltic and the Turks
 on the Black Sea, directed his attention to Persia and the
 Caspian. In Persia the last of the Safavid Shahs were con-
 fronted with civil war and a desperate Afghan invasion, and
 Peter took advantage of the anarchy by making an attack on
 Russian property at Shemakha the excuse for invading the

THE COMING OF THE RUSSIANS

199

the towns of Akhaltsikh, Akhalkalaki and Khertvis; and **175**
advanced as far as Erzerum and Baiburt. By the Treaty of
Adrianople (1828) Russia remained in possession of Anapa,
and all Guria and the Pashalik of Akhaltsikh.

Thus, in three-quarters of a century of war the Russian
frontiers had been advanced from the Kuban and the Terek
to the Chorokh and the Araxes, and she came into the pos-
session of a territory whose economic possibilities had yet to
be realised and whose strategic position gave to her the oppor-
tunity of dominating the policies both of Persia and of Turkey.

IV

THE MOUNTAIN WAR (1816-1864)

DURING the thirty years in which the conquest of Transcau-
casia was in process, the Russians were engaged simultaneously **175**
in organising the vast territories in the North Caucasus which **563**
had come under their rule through the gradual settlement **721**
of Cossack bands, the expulsion of the native nomad tribes,
and the exclusion of the Turks. Until the middle of the
eighteenth century the Cossacks of the Terek had been virtually
independent and associated freely with the native tribes, with
whom they came into conflict in mutual raids, but with whom
their relations were no more hostile than were those of the tribes
with each other. But as the power of the central authority
increased, the dividing line between the Cossacks and the
Caucasian tribes became more distinct. On the one hand
the Cossacks were organised into *voiskos* or military divisions,
and in 1816 forfeited the right of electing their own *atamans*.
On the other hand the native tribes, who had fraternised with
the free Cossack communities, regarded with suspicion that
Muscovite Government which had treated with such harshness
the Lowland Tatars and which seemed determined to check
the raiding expeditions which had been their occupation for
centuries.

Further, the Turkish wars and the constant propaganda **175**
of Mussulman mullahs tended to accentuate their distrust **721**
and to arouse their fanaticism. The continued independence
and hostility of the mountaineers were intolerable to the Russian
Government. On the one hand the raids of the mountaineers
caused considerable harm to the prosperity of the colonists;

THE RESOURCES OF GEORGIA,

466 *Labour Conditions: Recent Socialist Legislation.*—Previous to the Revolution the economic conditions of the working classes in the Caucasus had left much to be desired. During the first decade of the present century the organisation of unions and their subsequent action had caused the employers, particularly foreign, to concede a number of amelioratory measures, such as the construction of model houses, schools, public libraries, baths and hospitals. The conditions of living on the petroleum fields was less satisfactory than those of the mining-regions, and it was at Baku that the labouring classes were most unsettled. In the summer of 1914 some very significant strikes took place. The demands of the men included better housing, improvement of sanitary conditions of dwellings, a month's holiday each year on full pay, the abolition of overtime and piece-work, etc., etc. It was difficult to foresee to what results the strikes would have led had they continued. At the beginning of war, however, the strikes suddenly came to an end by the men resuming work.

466 On the outbreak of the Russian Revolution Baku proved to be one of the centres of industrial extremism, and when the **578** Bolsheviks seized power in the autumn of 1917 a Soviet administration was established in the oil-fields which endured **523** until the middle of 1918. With the Turkish occupation the conservative oil-magnates were restored to power, and, basing their policy on the principles of Turan and Islam, they were successful in obtaining the support of the Tatar workmen against their Armenian and Russian fellows. The differences between the Mussulman and Christian elements continued to divide the proletariat of the oil-fields, and the hostility of the Armenian and Russian workmen towards the Tatar Government was one of the factors favourable to the re-establishment of a Russian Bolshevik régime.

466 In Georgia, where the industrial element was weaker, the tendency towards extremism was less marked. The Social **523** Democrats indeed had to base their policy on the support of the peasants who, secure in the possession of their land, evinced little sympathy for any other principles of social evolution. A series of regulations establishing workmen's committees to participate in the management of concerns, regulating wages in accordance with the cost of living, guaranteeing security of employment and imposing State arbitration in the case of disputes, were the only modifications of the former industrial organisation which the Social Democratic Government introduced. This moderation in industrial legislation, combined

THE CAUCASUS AND AZERBAIJAN

257

with the repression of national minorities, tended to form among the Russian and Armenian workmen in Tiflis and Batum a Bolshevik minority. 466 563

The only result of the Revolution which appears likely to be permanent are the measures which expropriated the land-owners and gave possession of the land to the peasants. 423

This agrarian revolution was effected by a decree of the Transcaucasian Commissariat (December 16, 1917) which alienated from the original landowners all property over a certain fixed average (about 19 acres of land under intensive culture, vines, tobacco, cotton, etc.; about 41 acres of land under cereals; about 109 acres of pasturage) and appointed local commissions to supervise the division of the land confiscated among those holding less than the scheduled acreage, and among the majority who had hitherto been employed on the land only as paid labourers. In Georgia this agrarian revolution was carried out almost without bloodshed, for whilst many of the largest landowners were Russian Grand Dukes and officers absent from the Caucasus or impotent to protest, the native aristocracy wisely gave their approval to the measure.

In the Tatar districts the change was by no means recognised, and in many parts the begs, supported by the influence of the mullahs, succeeded in maintaining their position.

Conclusion.—The economic and social future of the Caucasus is necessarily involved in that of Russia, and the Soviet system of government is being introduced into the Caucasus, in conformity with that of Russia. It is consequently impossible to give here any present financial or commercial details of permanent value. Two points are, however, evident. Firstly, if the industries of the Caucasus—petroleum and manganese—are to be revived, and if its natural resources—copper, timber, water-power and agriculture—are to be developed, such modifications must of necessity be introduced into the social and industrial organisation as will afford to foreign capital some confidence of security of tenure and of amicable relations with labour. Lastly, the development of relations between the Soviet bureaucracy and the peasantry—who in the Caucasus, as in Russia, form the overwhelming majority of the population—must be considered. The peasantry certainly would not hesitate to resist any attempt to modify the terms of their tenure of the land, and the Bolsheviks will scarcely be prepared to risk an issue with them. It remains to be seen whether the efficiency of the young Jewish agri-

162 main ranges of the Caucasus, to the north of
101 them, belong to the area of Russian population.

Trans-Caucasia

In rather sharp contrast to the great multiplicity of the population of the alpine regions of the Caucasus, the wide Trans-Caucasian valley, as well as the Anti-Caucasus, are comparatively simple in their ethnological and linguistic composition. The eastern part of the area is preponderantly peopled by the Turkic Azerbaidjanians, deriving their name from the Caucasian land which they took over during the 11th century A. D. from Caucasian and Iranian peoples who at that time were under Arab overlordship. These Azerbaidjanians penetrated the valleys of the Kura and the Araxes, even beyond Tiflis and Erivan. Therefore, preponderantly non-Azerbaidjanian populations are found only in northern and central Armenia, the Armenians, and in Karabakh, where after the Armenians the Kurds are in the majority. In the region of Kars, the Azerbaidjanians and their closest relatives, the Osman Turks, the conquerors of Anatolia and thus of the Byzantine Empire, are found side by side.

Armenians

162 The Armenians appear as strong minor-
563 ities all over Trans-Caucasia, along the Aghry-
Chai and the southern slopes of the Great

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Caucasus, in and around the cities of Nukha and Shemakha and along the northeastern slopes of the northeastern border mountains of the Anti-Caucasus. These are in the rural districts, mainly Armenian peasants, while numerous Armenians are found in the diaspora of all bigger Caucasian and Trans-Caucasian cities. Some of these cities were founded by Armenians; for instance, Armavir, the important railroad hub in the Northwestern Caucasian area, which bears the name of one of the oldest known Armenian cities. It is interesting to note that the majority of the Armavir Armenians speak Cherkess as their everyday language. The Armenians who had received Christianity from the south, from Syria, before the rule of Constantine the Great, were exposed at various epochs of history to religious and political oppression and persecution, and are like the Jews, one of the oldest nations of refugees and emigres, whose members can be found all over the world. Their more compact diaspora groups live in Russia, Syria, Constantinople, Podolia (westernmost Ukraine), Vienna, Transylvania, Venice, Munich, Paris, and the United States.

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The K'art'velians

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The central part of the Trans-Caucasian valley and the entire western part of Trans-

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Caucasia -- Colchis in a larger sense -- have for a long time been the home of one of the oldest nations of the Caucasus, the K'art'velians. This group has played a foremost role in the history of Caucasian culture. Their leading nationality is that of the Georgians, who call themselves K'art'veli. They were the first to be converted to Christianity, in the 4th century A. D., by Tsminda Nino, who came there from the south, from Armenia. With this event, Georgian history and literature begins. It may well be assumed that there was some culture in pre-Christian times which was dependent on that of Persia, as indicated by traces of an earlier K'art'velian fire cult as the expression of Zarathustrism. This was probably brought in by the Persians after their conquest of Trans-Caucasia, during the Akhaemenian dynasty.

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Like Armenia, Georgia always resisted Islamic domination; although politically not always successful, it never became an Islamic country. This explains the old and intimate cultural, religious, and political ties with Byzantium and later with Russia as the substitute and continuation of the East-Roman theocracy. This guaranteed Georgia's cultural, religious, and political survival.

This region of Trans-Caucasia differs in many, if not all, respects from the vast

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plains of eastern Europe, the solitudes of Anatolia and Iran, or the deserts of Central Asia. Their exterior aspect reminds one of Southern France, Italy, Spain or even the valleys of the Rhine and its tributaries in Western Germany. The landscape and its cultivation -- small scale, individual agriculture, gardens, vineyards; the picturesque villages, townships, and cities along the rivers or embedded in the verdant foothills of the high mountains--with their cathedrals, churches, and fortifications; and the many castles or ruins from the time of feudalism on hilltops and mountain crests; all these seem to have taken forms very similar to the European. The people as well, although their many languages are completely different, remind one of Mediterranean Europeans in their appearance, vivacity, eloquence, pride, charm, and other facets of their behavior. Nevertheless, this is not Europe; even apart from customs and languages, the differences are immediately noticeable, e. g., in the utensils, the dress, the style in art and craftsmanship, the tools with which the people work. There is an absence of many things which the capitalist age has produced, or some modern implements are superimposed upon an essentially pre-capitalist stage of development, often in

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105 a most crude way, which sometimes is found so obtrusive and shocking in many Oriental countries of the present epoch. The technical backwardness--actual or imagined--is thus often matched by a technocratic overemphasis which threatens to level out everything these countries have produced and contributed to their own and to common human culture.

Georgians

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101 The K'art'velians or Georgians proper have been split into two groups, an eastern and western, by the intrusion of Oset'i from the north and the Azerbaidjanians from the south-east. The latter extend as far northwestward as the immediate vicinity of the modern capital of Georgia, Tiflis, (in Georgian: T'bilisi, [103] "Hot Springs" from the stem tp'ili [Georgian] "warm;" common with Indo-European, cf. Slav. [Čech.] place-name Teplice, "Hot Springs," mentioned above; Lat. tepidus, "warm," etc.); and from Tiflis southeastward, the Azerbaidjanians hold the entire valley of the Kura (in Georgian: Mtkvari, Strabon's Kyros). The Georgians hold only the Aragvi valley (Strabon's Aragos), the upper Iora, almost the entire Alazani (Strabon's Alazonios)—this is Kakhet'ia, and the upper Kura valley. The Meskhi-Surami Range and the eastern and southern portion of Colchis, Imeret'ia (practically all the land at the left bank, i. e., south

162 periods of minorities only, since none could be considered a majority. In most towns and cities, prior to the Russification period of the late Thirties and early Forties, no one nationality constituted a majority by itself; usually there were two or three. For example: Baku in 1929 had half a million inhabitants, 85% of whom were divided almost equally among Azerbaidjanians, Russians, and Armenians; the Azerbaidjanians were the most numerous, but exceeded the Russians and Armenians by an insignificant percentage only. The distribution of nationalities in Tiflis in 1929 was similar, the three major nationalities being the Georgians, Armenians, and Russians. On the other hand, a single group represented a strong majority in such places as Erivan, with a population of 62,000 in 1929, of whom 56,000 were Armenians, and 6,000 Turks and Azerbaidjanians. Vladikavkaz had a population of 74,000 some time before 1928, which was divided as follows: 57.8 % Russians, 10.5 % Armenians, 6.6 % Germans, 2.3 % Persians, 2 % Greeks, 1.5 % Jews, and 0.7 % Ingush. (cf. also the Tables.)

The following national minorities should be mentioned here: the Greeks, the Aisors, and the Germans.

Greeks

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The Greeks have been living on the west coast of the Caucasus since the time

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when the Ionian colonists, starting out from Miletos, began to establish trading-posts all around the Black Sea, and to settle there. This occurred on that part of the Black Sea coast as early as the 8th and 7th centuries B. C. It was the Milesians who established the farthest-flung colonies: they reached not only the Black Sea basin, but also the western part of the Mediterranean, with Massalia (Marseille) as their greatest western emporium. These Milesians founded the cities of Trapezunt (), Phasis (-P'ot'i), Dioskurias (-Cxumi or Sukhum), and Pityus (-Biciunta), Rus. Pitsunda, at the estuary of the Bzipi. They likewise established trading posts and ports on the Strait of Kerch, at Pantikapaion on the Crimean side, Phanagoreia on the Caucasian shore, the Taman peninsula, and the post of Tanais at the estuary of the Don, also called Tanais in Greek. The Greeks have maintained their nationality there, although not always exactly on the original spot, with an unbroken mercantile and cultural tradition, right down to the present. From these parts they have also spread out to other cities of the Caucasus.

Aisors

In contrast to the Greeks, the two other groups are newcomers. The Aisors, who speak a New Syrian dialect and are Oriental

- 563 Christians of Nestorian and Jacobite rites, came in the 19th century, after Trans-Caucasia was united with Russia. They fled from religious persecution in their homeland, upper Mesopotamia and the region around Lake Urmia. They live for the greater part near Erivan, but may be found in cities all over the Soviet Union. In the early years after the Revolution, they lived in every large city, where they usually conducted the shoe-shine business. Many of them were cobblers or practiced some other craft.

Germans

The Germans migrated to the Caucasus at the same time, coming from their former Russian homes on the Volga or in the southern Ukraine; they had been living there since the middle of the 18th century, during the rule of Empress Catherine II. There are a number of German villages, some of them of as considerable a size as the stanitsy, scattered over the North-Caucasian plains and Trans-Caucasia. Prior to the collectivization period, they lived in well-to-do communities, engaging mainly in agriculture, horticulture, and viniculture (the latter in Trans-Caucasia). In Trans-Caucasia there were a few economically well developed communities south and southwest of Tiflis, some south of Kirovabad, and a few in Kakhet'ia, on the upper Iora. The products of these large German villages were well-known and esteemed

- 563 all over the Soviet Union. -- These communities, recognizable not only for their German names, were nationally very exclusive (this for economic considerations to a large degree), and had preserved many features of 18th century German peasant life. It is improbable that the German communities exist today.

Multanis

- 778
177 On the peninsula of Apsheron, near Surakhany, 20 km. east of Baku, a small old fire temple is found, in the midst of a pentagon which once was a kind of monastery for the fire worshippers. This pentagon, with a little square grey temple, is usually called Ātashgāh ("Place of the Fire"), as the Persians designate the Zoroastrian sanctuaries. All around this Atashgah, the oil derricks rise to the sky, in the midst of surface piping and oil puddles. During the 18th century and the first half of the 19th, the Atashgah was a much-visited goal of pilgrims from western India, which for a long time—at least from the 16th century on—had maintained very close commercial relations with Azerbaidjan. Thus, the Parsis seem to have rediscovered the Sacred Spot where the Holy Fire leaps forth from the earth, as had been known from times immemorial. Hence the name Azerbaidjan, meaning in Pahlavi (in the form of Ādar-baōgān) "The home of the fire"; hence the erection of the little temple in which the Holy Flame could be venerated. Not long

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

[Chechen]

displaying worthy resistance to the enemy, derailling trains, blowing up bridges, destroying ammunition and fuel depots.³

Only a few weeks after Kalinin had made his panegyric statement little was left of the Caucasian 'miracle', and of the idyllic situation which the Soviet President had depicted. When the German armies occupied the Northern Caucasus region many mountaineers manifested their hostility towards the Soviet régime. They attempted to use the retreat of the Red Army to free themselves from what they considered the 'Russian yoke'. Over twenty years of Soviet rule had not altered their ingrained conviction that Russia's foes were their friends. These peoples apparently thought that they owed as little loyalty to Russia as the Indonesians deemed themselves to owe to the Dutch and the Vietnamese to the French when their respective countries were occupied by Japan. In the official Soviet view, of the seven peoples who in 1920 had formed the Mountain Republic four had shown themselves particularly unreliable in the crucial winter of 1942-43. They were the Chechens (407,600 according to the 1939 census), the Ingush (92,074), the Balkars (42,660) and the Karachay (75,737). After the North Caucasus region had been cleared of the invaders, the Soviet Government found itself unable to forgive these nationalities for their disloyalty or even their indifference. It also abandoned all further attempts to transform them into good citizens of the U.S.S.R. and expelled them from the 'happy family of Soviet peoples'. All of them lost the special territorial administrative units which the Stalin Constitution of 1936 had bestowed on them. Early in 1944 they were rounded up and deported to far away places in Siberia. For all practical purposes they ceased to exist. Thus were abolished the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous S.S.R. and the Autonomous Province of the Karachay. The Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R. was transformed into the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. after having been relieved of the 'burden' of the Balkar traitors.

Soviet policy in the Northern Caucasus differed to some extent from Czarist policy since it resulted in the building of schools, theatres, libraries and hospitals, but for the four deported nationalities all this had been of little use. From their point of view there is hardly any difference between the policy of General Yermolov and that of Generalissimo Stalin. Indeed, the Soviet régime deprived at least as many Caucasian mountaineers of their homes as did the Czarist régime.

CONTINUITY OF RUSSIAN CAUCASUS POLICY: THE CHECHENS

The Chechens, as the most numerous nationality left in the Northern Caucasus after the emigration of the Circassians, offer a particularly good example of the continuity of Russian policy. The Large Soviet Encyclopedia rightly summed up the historical role of the Chechens by

1 [Cf. category 116, pp. 182-184, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, p. 183, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

Ca.
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S.U.
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Ca.
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563 describing them as the 'most active and strongest opponents of the
175 Czarist Government during the conquest of the Caucasus'. The Russians suffered extensive and costly disasters at the hands of this people, who were unequalled in forest warfare.

103 Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the Chechens have challenged the Russian Empire, but from 1818 onwards their resistance to Russian rule assumed major proportions. In that year General Yermolov built a fortress to subjugate more easily the land of the Chechens. He called the new fortress 'Grozny', meaning 'menacing' and 'formidable'. The name of Grozny had a deeper meaning than might appear at the first glance: it was the symbol of a political programme that Yermolov defined in the following words: 'I wish that the terror of my name should guard our frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my word should be for the natives a law more inevitable than death'. Grozny became Yermolov's headquarters, and it was from Grozny that countless Russian expeditions set out 'to punish raiders, avenge defeats, establish new posts, relieve beleaguered garrisons, or rescue retreating bands and armies'.⁴ The Russian campaign against Chechenia reached its climax in 1840, at the time of the great Chechen rising under the leadership of Imam Shamil. The breakdown of Shamil's fanatical Moslem movement led to the gradual submission of the Chechens in the years 1857-59.

175 The Russian authorities knew well that these new subjects of the Czar,
167 after all the trouble they had caused, would not easily reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom; so an attempt was made to settle the 'Chechen problem' by a double transfer of population. Immediately after the conquest the inhabitants of forty-four auls (mountain villages) were transplanted from the mountains to the plains, where they could more easily be controlled. The more rebellious ones were forced to emigrate to Turkey, where they were given hospitality on the express demand of the Russian Government. In the summer of 1865, 39,000 Chechens, one-fifth of the entire Chechen population at that date, left Russia. Those who stayed behind did not remain quiescent. In 1877 there was another wave of unrest following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, and more trouble in 1886. A Russian monograph on the Chechens, published in 1894, said that they could not yet be considered 'fully pacified'; they still looked across the border to Turkey whither many more dreamed of emigrating.⁵ The emigration of the 39,000 had not eliminated the 'Chechen problem', for the birthrate of these Chechens was particularly high, far above the average in the Russian Empire.

CHECHEN-INGUSH MOSLEM OPPOSITION

669 The immediate consequence of the October Revolution in Chechenia was a revival of violent nationalism and religious fanaticism among the

TRANSCAUCASIAN MINORITIES

of the Baku oilfields would play their part in awakening the Turkic national consciousness of the people of Persian Azerbaidzhan.⁵⁰ 563

The 'awakening' of the Azerbaidzhani Turks came earlier than the Soviet sociologists could have foreseen in 1930, and was a direct consequence of the Russian military occupation of Northern Persia of 1941-46. During this occupation the Persian Azerbaidzhani were brought into close contact with the people of the Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic, and it is small wonder that the idea of a union took shape in the two Azerbaidzhans, which, though widely differing economically and politically, are united by the bond of a common language. With the assistance of the 'brothers from the North' this Turkic language - ignored under Persian rule - was given the first place in education and administration all over Persian Azerbaidzhan. An Azerbaidzhani university and an Azerbaidzhani National Museum were opened, Azerbaidzhani books and newspapers were either printed on the spot or imported from Soviet Azerbaidzhan. While contact between Tabriz, the capital of Persian Azerbaidzhan, and Teheran was practically cut off, the most advanced Turkic nationalists were encouraged to look to Baku for political and cultural inspiration. Left-wing Azerbaidzhani poets praised Baku with oriental hyperbole. One of them, Tavrieli, described Baku as the 'Rose of beauty graved in stone' and another, Muhammed Biriya, poet and also secretary of the trade unions of Persian Azerbaidzhan, said he came to Baku to drink the 'life-giving water' of this city and that he wept 'happy tears' on seeing Baku.⁵⁰ 563

In 1946, when the Soviet troops left Northern Persia, the Persian Government only too easily swept away the régime set up by pro-communist Azerbaidzhani autonomists in Tabriz. The nationalism of the Azerbaidzhani Turks of Persia was still too feeble to put up a successful resistance even to a weak Persian State. The end of the Azerbaidzhani separatist government was, however, not the end of the Azerbaidzhan problem. The Soviet régime did its best to keep the issue alive both in Soviet 'Northern Azerbaidzhan' and in Persian 'Southern Azerbaidzhan'. Soviet Azerbaidzhani poets and writers continued to deal in their works with the problem of the unredeemed brothers in the South and thus to foster an irredentist ideology among the people of the Azerbaidzhani S.S.R. On the other hand communist refugees from Southern Azerbaidzhan were given shelter in Baku and were assisted in their efforts to keep in touch with the Turkic-speaking people of Northern Persia.

IV. TRANSCAUCASIAN MINORITIES

Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaidzhani Turks are the three 'state nations' of Transcaucasia, but they do not exhaust the nationality prob- 563 ●

[Talysh]
TRANSCAUCASIA

[Aissor]

Co. lems facing the Soviet Government in that part of the Russian Empire.

563 Each of the three Transcaucasian republics also includes a large number
S.U. of ethnical minorities which differ widely in character and can, from

563 the point of view of the Soviet régime, be classed into three categories:

[101] 1. Minorities organically linked with the three Transcaucasian state
nations (Ossetins and Abkhazians in Georgia, Talyshi in Azerbaidzhan*).
They are a purely internal problem of the Transcaucasian Soviet
Republics.

2. Minority groups, mainly made up of immigrants, who proved to be
a handicap to the Soviet régime. These minorities included Germans in
Georgia and Azerbaidzhan, Greeks who, in 1926, formed 2 per cent of
the entire population of Georgia, Anatolian Turks in Armenia and small
groups of Persians. The Soviet Government treated all these minorities
at one time or another as potential agents of a foreign power. These
communities of immigrants were much reduced by deportations and
arrests during and after the Second World War.

3. Minority groups who can be used for purposes of Russian power
politics. This group comprises Assyrians and Kurds.

THE ASSYRIANS

C2. The Assyrians can be compared in many ways with the Armenians. They
563 are a Christian people scattered among Moslem countries, a people
[101] which has been deprived for many centuries of a State of its own. The
S.U. number of Assyrians who have survived oriental persecution is too
563 small to enable them to follow the example of the Armenians and
[101] rebuild a kind of 'National Home'. As a matter of fact, by interfering in
the life of this small Christian people Russia probably did more to
hasten their doom than to help them towards recovering from the blows
which their Moslem neighbours had inflicted on them.

During the First World War in particular the Assyrians had to pay
dearly for their pro-Russian sympathies. The Russian army relied in the
early part of the war on the Assyrians as allies behind the Turkish lines.
The Assyrians assisted the Russians, indeed, wherever they could, but
in return they did not obtain national liberation. Their fate was exile or
death. In May 1915, inspired by the expectation of Russian help, the
Assyrians started an insurrection but were unsuccessful. To save their
lives 40,000 Assyrians then embarked on a heroic march across difficult
mountain passes and finally reached the Russian side of the front. The
Russian authorities cordially welcomed them and the Grand Duke
Nikolay decorated the Mar Shimun, the political and religious leader

* The Talyshi are a people of Persian stock of whom 80,000 are living in the area of
Lenkoran on the Soviet-Persian border. They were not granted a special administrative
unit, presumably because their national consciousness is little developed. Most of them are
bilingual and speak Turkic in addition to their native tongue.

[Aissor]
TRANSCAUCASIAN MINORITIES

of the Assyrians, who had led the great migration. These platonic expressions of sympathy were of little help to the Assyrians. Transcaucasia was soon drawn into the turmoil of revolution and civil war and there was no Russian authority in existence which could be interested in the fate of the Assyrian people. S.U. 563 Ca. 563

It is not our task to follow up the further calvary of the Assyrians in Iraq, their recruitment into the famous Assyrian levies and the massacres of 1933 - we are concerned here only with the Russian aspect of the problem. Whilst the centre of gravity of the Assyrian nation was in Iraq, where the Mar Shimun had his residence, Soviet government circles claimed that the largest single group of Assyrians lived in the U.S.S.R. and thus, from the Russian point of view, the Assyrians had become one of the peoples of the Soviet Union.⁵¹

In 1935 the number of Assyrians in Russia was officially estimated at 50,000-60,000, but the 1939 census recorded not more than 20,000. They occupied eight villages in Transcaucasia and had also small colonies in Krasnodar, Rostov, Kiev, Leningrad and Moscow, where at one time over 2,000 Assyrians were counted. In all these places the Assyrians had their own national schools, and a special Assyrian section was established in the Teachers' Training College in the North Caucasus town of Armavir. Soviet Assyrians were looked after by a special Assyrian organization, 'Khoyadto', which both attended to their cultural needs and directed their mobilization for socialistic reconstruction work. S.U. 563 162

The Soviet Government found it a hard task to reconcile the Assyrian people with Bolshevik ideology, in view of their deep attachment to their ancient Nestorian Church. In April 1933, a statement of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee complained about 'undermining activities' which class-alien exploiting elements were alleged to have carried out amongst Soviet Assyrians. These 'elements' were said to have penetrated into Assyrian collective farms and co-operatives in an attempt to dominate them. S.U. 563 771 Ca. 563 771

The régime also found fault with the communists and Communist Youth League members who had been recruited amongst the Assyrians in 'considerable numbers', for even Assyrian communists seemed to have kept faith with their nation and its rich traditions. In the middle of the thirties the authorities turned against a number of Assyrian communists who had proved to be 'prisoners of family ties', and who had defended 'class enemies' because of their Assyrian nationality. These 'communists' had denied the necessity of class struggle inside the Assyrian people since they could not see any class divisions within a nation which had concentrated all its energies on its survival.⁵² Ca. 563 665 186

Soviet philologists also tried to replace the 'archaic' Syriac alphabet of the Assyrians. At first they gave them a Russian alphabet, then, in 1930, a Latin alphabet. This had to be revised two years later because it was 'unsuitable' and in the end the Russian alphabet was re-introduced. S.U. 563 212

∞ was 'unsuitable' and in the end the Russian alphabet was re-introduced.
 S.U. Many 'Soviet Assyrians' disliked the anti-religious policy of the Bol-
 sheviks, the continuous experiments which the Soviet authorities made
 with Assyrian cultural life, as well as the entire communist social
 system. A large number of Assyrians therefore left Russia for Iraq in
 the period between the wars to join the Assyrian levies under British
 command.

During and after the Second World War Soviet Russian power politics
 made use of the Assyrians of Northern Persia. Although their number
 was small Soviet occupation authorities mobilized them, together with
 local Armenians, in support of the pro-Russian autonomous régime
 established in Tabriz. After the withdrawal of the Red Army troops the
 Persian Assyrians suffered together with all other groups of the popula-
 tion in whom the Russians had shown particular interest.

RUSSIA AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

The small number of Assyrians in Middle Eastern countries (30,000 in
 Iraq, 9,000 in Syria, 25,000 in Persia) indicates that Russia could use them
 only for very limited purposes. The Kurds may become a more re-
 doubtable instrument in Russian hands. They are one of the most
 important factors in the Middle East. How many Kurds are there alto-
 gether? This purely statistical question is in itself part of the 'Kurdish
 problem'. In Turkey, for instance, official data referring to 1945 say that
 their number in that country does not exceed 1,900,000, but sources
 more favourable to the Kurdish national point of view speak of
 4,000,000 Turkish Kurds. It is significant that this latter figure is approv-
 ingly quoted in a Russian monograph on Turkey.⁵³ In addition, there
 are 800,000 Kurds in Iraq, 700,000 in Persia and 200,000 in Syria.

The four States with a Kurdish population are bound to draw closer
 to each other for military, geographical, political and economic reasons.
 The Kurdish question common to all of them to a greater or lesser
 degree may prove to cement their unity. Russia's interests are the exact
 opposite of those of the four Middle Eastern countries with Kurdish
 minorities. Russia is a bitter opponent of any kind of federation on her
 borders. What she wants is not Kurdish cement but Kurdish dynamite.

For a long time Soviet Russia had had no real Kurdish policy. The
 strength of Britain in the Middle East prevented both the Soviet Govern-
 ment and the Comintern from playing the Kurdish card. In Russian
 communist eyes the Kurds were but a 'counter-revolutionary force', a
 tool of British imperialism intended to embarrass Turkey, the Arab
 world and even the Soviet Union itself.

But even at the time when leading Soviet quarters still held this nega-
 tive view on the Kurds, they envisaged the possibility of a change in the

evaluation of the Kurdish factor. From the cultural point of view the S.U. Kurds were still an unwritten sheet of paper. Soviet Russia, so the communist strategists may have argued, thus stood the chance of exercising a paramount influence on the development and the character of a future Kurdish culture, if she only tried. 563 648

The raw material for such a Soviet experiment was the small Kurdish minority in Transcaucasia. The exact number of the Kurds in Soviet Russia is as difficult to ascertain as their number in any other country. Officially Russia had only 54,700 Kurds in 1926 and 45,800 in 1939, but unofficial pre-war data recorded as many as 80,000, of whom 40,000 were in Azerbaidzhan, 23,000 in Armenia and the rest in Georgia and Turkmenistan. Only in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were the Kurds a political problem. 61 62 63 64

For a long time neither Azerbaidzhani nor Armenian communists seemed to have grasped the importance of the Kurds within the framework of a far-sighted Soviet policy in the Middle East. They either neglected the Kurdish minorities living in their respective republics or even tried to deprive them of their national character.

The Armenian communists disliked the Kurds in view of the role which the latter had played in the Armenian massacres, and thus showed not the slightest interest in their well-being and their mobilization for the Soviet State. Kurds in Armenia were not entrusted with political and social work, no skilled workers were recruited from among them and Kurdish peasants were not even organized into collective farms.⁵⁴ In 1936, the Soviet central Government strongly reprimanded the Armenian communists for letting national animosities interfere with their Kurdish policy.

All the mistakes which local Transcaucasian authorities committed in handling the Kurdish question in the inter-war period proved to be unimportant at a moment when Russia was able to use the Kurdish issue on a big scale. Her success in handling the problem was then indisputable. Colonel W. G. Elphinston, who was in charge of Kurdish affairs as a British Middle East Intelligence Officer, said that the effects of propaganda in the Kurdish language originating in the Kurdish community in the U.S.S.R. made themselves felt as far away as Syria, and communist pamphlets in Kurdish penetrated as far as Cairo.⁵⁵ 563 725

The Kurdish group outside the U.S.S.R. most directly affected by Russian policy and propaganda were the Persian Kurds whose country was occupied by the Red Army between 1941 and 1946. The Soviet occupation authorities did not spread communist ideas among the Kurds; they did not propagate collectivization and nationalization. All they aimed at was to make the Kurds respectful to Soviet Russia, the Russian Army and Stalin. The Kurdish Republic set up with Russian help in 1946 under Quazi Mohammed as Prime Minister was a national 648 642

[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 250-251, R1 Sov. Union -- Analyst]

Cassat RH9
Caucasia RH1 •

0 [823 cont.]

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[589] relative of the deceased, who supports her if she is not married by her husband's father or brother, as was formerly their duty. Children born of this new marriage or born out of wedlock are regarded as children of the deceased and inherit his name and part of his estate, since the woman belongs to the husband's kin group.

b) Other Iranians, Indians, etc.

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Of the European peoples who have migrated in during the last century, only the Russians, as a ruling class, have exerted some influence on the spiritual life and the material possessions of the Caucasians; on the other hand, the Cossacks on the Kuban and Terek, as a result of friendly and hostile contact with the Cherkess, Abkhaz, and Tatars, have taken over much from them. [824] [Fig. 503 appears here.]

Of the Asiatic Indo-Germanic peoples, the Armenians (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 398 ff.) have played an essential role in the intellectual development of the plains Georgians (see p. 675 [untranslated]), and the physical relationship or admixture of the two, or to put it better, mixture of the native basic stock of the Near East with southern and eastern indigenous Caucasians, up to the Chechen in the northeast, appears visibly in many places (see pp. 31 f.).

As far as the Iranians are concerned, the Kurds (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 400 ff.) certainly came into contact with the Georgians relatively late and in any case have neither experienced any influence from them nor exerted any on them, or at most on their Gurian neighbors. The sect of the Yezid, who stand close to the Kurds in many respects, even with regard to their religious teachings, has settled in a few places in southernmost Caucasia (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 403 f.).

It is quite another matter with regard to the Persians (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 405 ff.), who, in part directly through trade or settlement, in part indirectly through Armenia, and later

[824 cont.]

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Fig. 503. Persian fruit-seller in Baku.

- 563
 [177] through the Tatars, have exerted a strong influence from the earliest times on southern and eastern Caucasia with regard to mental culture, art, warfare, etc. As a landmark of their power, the great stone wall, which extends from the national portal on the Caspian Sea, from the city [825] of Derbend
- [103] (Persian = gate-lock; Tatar, Demîr-kapû = iron door; Arabic, Bâb-el-abwâb = gate of gates), to the west 60 to 70 kilometers into the mountains, still stands today. It was erected by the Sassanid king, Khosrau Anōšarvân (531-579 A.D.), for protection against the invasions of the Khazar and Alan, against whom his father, Kobad (491-531), had already built a wall
- [102] of mud bricks that was strengthened by many towers and small citadels (kalé). Except for indigenous tribes, Khosrau entrusted the defense of the wall primarily to Iranian settlers whom he had brought over from Persia and the land of Sogd, that is Kharezmia and Samarkand. The inhabitants of the Kaitakh region, the Tabassaran, seem to be descendants of these settlers, and their name may be a contraction of Tabor-i-Khorassan (= host, people from Khorassan); likewise the Tāt between Baku, Kuba, and the Babadagh and near Derbend. The former may have sprung from a mixture of Lezgin with

[825 cont.]

Iranians (cf. p. 674 f. [untranslated]) and accordingly are called by the Tatar *Āzade khalkh'* or *khelaiq* (= free people), as are all Lezgin, in contrast to the *Tār*, who are called *raiya khelaiq* (= subject people). Their name is related to that of the central Asian Tajik (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 412 ff.), and their language is close [Fig. 504 appears here] [826] to modern Persian; it is also spoken by the mountain Jews in Dagestan and on the Terek. In their old cemeteries and near their villages there are isolated ruins of buildings that indicate Christianity in former times. Their relatives, the Talysh in humid, hot Lenkoran on the Caspian Sea, surrounded by Azerbaijani and Tatars, speak another variety of modern Persian that is supposed to contain much Old Persian.

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[172]

As late as the first half of the nineteenth century, a remnant of the Old Persians, adherents of the teachings of Zoroaster or Zerdusht, the Geber, lived on the plain of Surakhane or Ateshga (= fire-land) near Baku, where a temple stood, in which they worshiped the eternal fire fed by a natural gas source. They had moved here from Persia after they had been driven from there and their main temple on the mountain near Yesd destroyed; they gradually



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Fig. 504. Two-wheeled carriage, Baku region.

2: Byhan--99 E-4 (no date) 1926

RI3 Abkhaz

Caucasia

Tat Mountain Jews

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died out, and Hindu-speaking coreligionists finally took their place as guardians of the shrine.

The few Gypsies who wander about southern Caucasia and are called Armenian Gypsies (Boša) are also of Indic origin; their language is West Armenian in structure, and the vocabulary is from various sources.

5. Semitic Peoples

The sect of the Nestorians or Chaldeans (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 404 f.) has a few settlements in the Karay steppe on the Kura and in Tiflis; they immigrated from Persia, from which they had been expelled in 1827. The Persians called them Nasran, the Armenians, Aissor; they speak Persian, but Aramaic is used for religious services. The women's dress resembles that of the Yezid (see Vol. II, 1, Fig. 270).

The Arabs, who penetrated into Caucasia in the eighth century and settled there -- Muslimeh ben Abdul Malik, who came to Derbend in 733, is supposed to have settled 24,000 (?) Arab families from Syria and from Mesopotamia in Tabassaran -- have merged completely with the Lezgin and Chechen (see p.31). From time to time, however, one meets people who still boast of their Arabic descent.

[827]

Mountain Jews

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The number of mountain Jews (Dagh-Tšufut) is supposed to come to about 30,000 (or 120,000 including those Jews who have immigrated from Russia in the last decades). In southern Caucasia they speak Georgian, in the east and north, Tatar.

In the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., after the revolution caused by the Iranian invasion, or the so-called Babylonian captivity, members of this people, called Hebrews and Israelites in Palestine, which clearly arose from Near Easterners with a Semitic strain in north Syria, settled farther north in Armenia

6. Turkic Peoples

563 Among the Turkic-Tatar peoples in the Caucasus who have not mixed intimately with Caucasians, there are the Azerbaijani Tatars in the Persian cultural sphere (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 396 ff.) and the Tarakamá, the Karapapakh, and the Turks near Batum and Kars in the Ottoman-Kurdish sphere (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 385 ff. and pp. 400 ff.). The Trukhmen and the Mongolian Kalmyk in the northern steppes have preserved the essential peculiarities of their fellow tribesmen beyond the Caspian Sea (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 342 ff.) and in the Altai region (see Vol. II, 1, pp. 364 f.).

a) The Mountain Tatar

K 101 The Karachai and the mountain Kabardin or Taulu stand in the same relation to the Old Caucasians as do the mountain Jews. The Karachai live west of the Elbrus (Mingi-tau) on the source streams of the Kuban, which surround the Uchkulan (= three belts), up to the Teberda. In the east their neighbors are the Kabardin and Taulu, in the south, the Swan, in the north, Russians and the Abkhaz; to the west and southwest there are uninhabited mountain ranges. They appear to have obtained their name from a stream (karačai = black brook), not from an ancestor, Karacha. The Cherkess call them Karšaga-Kuš'a, the Georgians, Karat'voli, the northern Tatar, Kara-Tšerkes (likewise the Georgians in the Middle Ages: Kara-Džik'i; their country, Kara-Džakhet'i), that is, subjects of the Cherkess.

K 174
177
K 648 According to tradition, they immigrated from the Crimea about four centuries ago, but they are probably descendants of the Tatars who were driven out of the Kuban region by the Cherkess and fled into this avowed retreat area; here they mixed with refugees from Svanetia, Mingrelia, and Abkhazia, and with Cherkess. They paid tribute to the Kabardin before they came under the domination of the Russians in the thirties of the last century.